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Abstract
The economic evaluation of new health technologies to assess whether the value of the expected health beneits warrants 
the proposed additional costs has become an essential step in making novel interventions available to patients. This assess-
ment of value is problematic because there exists no natural means to measure it. One approach is to assume that society 
wishes to maximize aggregate health, measured in terms of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). Commonly, a single ‘cost-
efectiveness’ threshold is used to gauge whether the intervention is suiciently eicient in doing so. This approach has 
come under ire for failing to account for societal values that favor treating more severe illness and ensuring equal access to 
resources, regardless of pre-existing conditions or capacity to beneit. Alternatives involving expansion of the measure of 
beneit or adjusting the threshold have been proposed and some have advocated tacking away from the cost per QALY entirely 
to implement therapeutic area-speciic eiciency frontiers, multicriteria decision analysis or other approaches that keep the 
dimensions of beneit distinct and value them separately. In this paper, each of these alternative courses is considered, based 
on the experiences of the authors, with a view to clarifying their implications.
Key Points for Decision Makers 
Valuing new health technologies is diicult because 
choices must be made regarding which efects to con-
sider and how to relect their value in monetary terms.
A commonly implemented approach involves putting a 
price to a quality-adjusted life-year. This may be consid-
ered in light of other factors, such as society may give 
priority to more severe illnesses and ensuring fair access 
to resources, but the processes for doing so are neither 
systematic nor transparent.
Approaches to address broader societal values remain 
rudimentary but deserve signiicant eforts to operation-
alize them.
1 Introduction
In most countries, clinicians and patients do not have unfet-
tered access to all interventions that can help prevent, diag-
nose, or treat illness. Even if an intervention is efective 
and reasonably safe, a decision must be made on whether 
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to pay for it. If the outlays required are too high, its use may 
be restricted or funding withheld [1]. Although these deci-
sions are taken routinely, they are di cult because assessing 
what is ‘too high’ involves determining what is reasonable to 
pay for a given beneit, and this requires putting a price on 
health gains and other intangibles for which there is no clear 
monetary valuation, as well as making comparisons across 
individuals. Ultimately, the value of health efects has to do 
with what one gives up to obtain them, but that ‘opportunity’ 
cost is rarely directly evident.
Where the trade-of can be gauged (for example, a hospi-
tal), it is feasible to approach the problem directly without 
explicitly valuing the consequences (e.g. to pay for this inter-
vention we must close a bed) [2]. By contrast, determining 
value at the healthcare system level is extremely challenging 
because it is di cult to identify what will be displaced. This 
is even less clear in systems without a ixed budget, or where 
insurance premiums might be increased.
A common approach involves estimating the outlays and 
gains, and assigning them value without invoking opportu-
nity cost directly. Since most outlays are measured in mone-
tary units, their valuation is straightforward, but health gains 
are not naturally assessed this way. This poses a problem 
for weighing consequences measured in diferent clinical 
units. A common approach is to convert them into duration 
of life, modiied by its quality, or quality-adjusted life-years 
(QALYs) [3], and then apply a price per QALY gained (i.e. 
‘cost-efectiveness threshold’). If this gain exceeds the out-
lay [4], then the intervention is deemed worthwhile [5]. This 
determination is made without identifying what to displace 
or assessing the opportunity costs, although there have been 
recent attempts to do so [6–8].
The objective of our work was to produce a white paper 
to help further deliberations on determining value in the UK 
and elsewhere. The irst author selected the other six experts 
to represent a wide range of viewpoints. The seven met in 
London, UK, in 2016, where each participant was asked 
to address: (1) What should health technology assessment 
(HTA) achieve? (2) What should be the approach to value-
based pricing? Based on these deliberations, a draft paper 
was circulated for comment. Further telephone discussions 
led to additional versions, and four of the authors partici-
pated in an Issues Panel at an International Society for Phar-
macoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) meeting 
in Glasgow. There was substantial disagreement but no pres-
sure to reach consensus. Instead, in this paper, we examine 
these challenging aspects to consider possible improvements 
to value determination in HTA. We begin by contemplating 
the aims of healthcare and then set out the requirements for 
value assessment. An examination of the options follows, 
ranging from staying the course1 with evidence-based rein-
forcement, through extending the cost per QALY approach 
to address some limitations, to abandoning it altogether and 
tacking to an alternative. Based on this examination, we 
make some recommendations for consideration by health-
care systems when reforming their HTA processes.
2  The Societal Aims for the Healthcare 
System
A healthcare system funded by citizens’ contributions must 
aim to meet the needs that arise due illness. It should strive 
to restore and maintain health, providing palliation when 
necessary. As the needs are vast and ways of meeting them 
ever-expanding, no system can fully achieve these goals, 
implying choices when deploying resources and the addi-
tional aim of ensuring these are consistent with society’s 
objectives. Various theories have emerged as to what these 
are.
One theory is that society wishes to maximize the aggre-
gate health of the population [3], with the aggregate deined 
as the sum of health across all citizens, regardless of who 
bears what illness or beneit. An alternative view is that 
fairness matters [9] and that assuming a QALY is a QALY 
regardless of who receives it is not entirely fair because other 
aspects, such as severity of illness, are relevant [10]. A key 
criterion is that everyone should have equal access to neces-
sary care [11], including not prioritizing those with greater 
capacity to beneit, either because more can be done for them 
or because they were healthier beforehand [12]. This means 
that it is acceptable to commit resources to manage an illness 
that is given higher societal priority. This alternative view is 
supported by studies indicating that citizens are concerned 
not only with their own treatment but also that of others [13]. 
This appeal to communitarian values [14] implies sharing 
scarce resources even if this reduces aggregate population 
health gain because more QALYs could have been obtained 
via some other use and is supported by empirical research 
[15, 16]. However, regardless of the criteria adopted, some 
interpersonal comparison is involved, even if implicitly.
If societal healthcare objectives expand beyond health gain, 
any number of other aspects might be considered, such as 
well-being, burden of illness, degree of unmet need, improved 
productivity, impact on caregivers, improved organizational 
eiciency, public dislike for all-or-nothing decisions that may 
1 When two boats at sea are on a collision course, the skipper on 
the burdened vessel (because, for example, it is on port tack and 
approaching a starboard tack boat) radios or yells ‘stay the course’ or 
‘hold your course’ to the stand-on vessel if she thinks she can safely 
cross in front; otherwise the burdened vessel ‘tacks away’ to avoid a 
collision.
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discriminate (for example, against those with orphan diseases), 
maintenance of hope, and even the intervention’s innovative-
ness [15, 17, 18]. Pursuit of such objectives is not necessar-
ily inconsistent with evaluation of cost efectiveness based 
on thresholds, but they augment or even constrain the cost-
efective outcomes to be delivered.
3  Stay the Course—‘Eiciency First’, 
as Exempliied by National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
in the UK
The common approach, beneitting from extensive expe-
rience, judges health gains in terms of QALYs against a 
predetermined cost per QALY threshold, taken to represent 
the opportunity cost [19] or willingness-to-pay for new 
interventions [20]. The QALY, proposed as a health status 
index to aid clinical decisions involving trade-ofs between 
duration and quality of life [21], is not itself a measure of 
value. Tarifs based on trade-ofs among health states have 
to be applied but these only represent preference valuations 
if exceptional and, to many, unreasonable assumptions hold 
[22]. These tarifs consider the gain as having a linear value: 
zero QALYs equals no value, one QALY equals one unit of 
value, two QALYs equal double the value, etc. Health gains 
can only be considered if they can be measured in QALYs 
and the nature of the gain, whether in duration or quality of 
life, is not considered. No other factors are accorded value.
Recently, concerted eforts have been made to provide an 
evidence base for the threshold [6–8]. An average was com-
puted in Australia and Spain using national mortality data 
and quality-of-life data from surveys. In the UK study, health 
authority data on cost increases and mortality reductions 
from one year to the next were used to compute a cost per 
QALY threshold in each of 23 broadly deined therapeutic 
areas (in some it could not be calculated), with substan-
tial variation across resulting estimates (Fig. 1). Although 
the original theory implies that the threshold is the highest 
cost-efectiveness ratio [23], the researchers instead took the 
mean across areas, weighting more eicient practice areas 
higher. A recent systematic review of 120 empirical eco-
nomic studies, reporting estimates of the value of a statistical 
life-year using a variety of approaches, found the median to 
be nearly US $200,000 among European studies, and even 
higher among American studies [24, 25].
4  Broadening the Scope of the Cost 
per Quality‑Adjusted Life‑Year (QALY)
One possibility for broadening the cost per QALY approach 
is to incorporate other domains, such as the impact on rela-
tionships, autonomy and meaning [26], for example in a 
measure termed a WELBY (see Brazier and Tsuchiya [27]). 
Another idea is to consider that eiciency relative to the 
threshold is but one input into determining an intervention’s 
value [28], and other inputs can be incorporated by delibera-
tion [29]. The methods for these deliberations are not well 
codiied, including how to resolve disputes and how to weigh 
factors. Although most HTA agencies allow for discussion, 
it has been recognized that the numerical nature of the cost-
efectiveness ratio and its clear juxtaposition to a threshold 
tends to hold sway over more qualitative aspects [30].
Adjusting the threshold [31] to take severity of illness 
into account is used with ‘end-of-life’ interventions in the 
UK [32]. This tactic can be extended to consider the ‘burden 
of illness’, as is done in Sweden [33], that is the degree to 
which an illness decreases QALYs [34] and applying dif-
ferent threshold prices accordingly. Indeed, an even higher 
threshold has been advocated for the treatment of rare dis-
eases [35]. Apart from diiculties forecasting the QALYs 
lost [36, 37], it is unresolved if burden should be considered 
in proportional or absolute terms (thus favouring those with 
longer life expectancy or better quality of life beforehand), 
and how to take this into account in valuing an intervention.
5  Tacking Away from the Cost per QALY
The adjusted threshold approach could be further relaxed 
by eliminating the imperative to measure beneit in terms of 
QALYs. If separate thresholds are contemplated for diferent 
Fig. 1  Empirical estimates of cost efectiveness relative to total cost, 
both axes on a logarithmic scale. The number beside each label is 
the total cost efectiveness, in thousands. Note, three categories—
Social Care, Trauma, and Other—plotted on the horizontal axis have 
unknown cost efectiveness and only total cost. GBP Great British 
Pound, GI gastrointestinal, GU genitourinary, ID infectious disease, 
MSK musculoskeletal, UNK unknown, QALY quality-adjusted life-
year
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contexts, then this can be extended to each therapeutic area 
where the clinical measures of beneit are well established, 
and can include whatever aspects are relevant, even if they 
do not map well onto either duration or quality of life. The 
implied willingness to pay for beneits in a therapeutic area 
can be established using the ‘eiciency frontier,’ as is done 
in Germany [38]. However, if an intervention is the irst in a 
therapeutic area, there is no established price, requiring use 
of a frontier from a similar area as a gauge.
Multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) [39] provides for 
addressing a range of efects against a criteria set, which 
can include duration and quality of life, but also extend to 
whatever other aspects are relevant, scored and aggregated 
by quantitatively weighting their importance. For a choice 
among interventions, MCDA provides the necessary ranking 
without requiring further valuation, but it is unclear how this 
applies when deciding whether to fund a particular interven-
tion. The MCDA score by itself does not address this, nor 
does it consider opportunity costs, and it presents its own 
technical diiculties [40].
Rather than aggregating multiple dimensions into a single 
score, the components can be kept distinct and each one val-
ued separately [41]. Gradients of value (Fig. 2) are proposed 
to accord with the premise that value increases with severity, 
but there is diminishing marginal value as health is restored 
(also noted empirically in the study by Rowen et al. [41]). 
Diferent gradients are applied to each domain and other 
criteria afecting them can be incorporated. One point is 
priced and this used as an anchor. The maximum reimburs-
able price for any intervention is established by summing 
the monetary values of each type of gain (under the strong 
assumption that they are independent).
Many stated preference studies may have been misspeci-
ied because they were restricted to use value [42], which 
excludes option value (e.g. access in case of need; risk 
aversion) and altruistic motivations, which can be captured 
by choosing increments in private or public insurance pre-
miums as the payment vehicle [43, 44]. These, or the Rela-
tive Social Willingness to Pay [45], imply a focus on social 
transfer payments and a greater role for the budgetary impact 
of healthcare programs [17, 46]. Fairness-based evaluation 
frameworks, sometimes collectively referred to as (social) 
‘cost-value analysis’ [47], have not reached suicient matu-
rity to be recommended for formal implementation in HTA.
6  Discussion
This paper provides a summary of alternative approaches 
to assessing value to inform the selection of societally pre-
ferred healthcare options. Ultimately, everyone would like 
to see that funds expended on healthcare provide suicient 
value to ofset the opportunity costs. Nonetheless, positions 
diverge on what the healthcare system’s aims should be and 
these largely determine whether the preference is to stay 
the course or tack away. If maximizing aggregate health is 
the aim, then sticking with cost per QALY gained gauged 
against a threshold is appealing. Nevertheless, this implies 
society must be willing to tolerate the many known prob-
lems with the QALY [48–50]. However, there is growing 
dissatisfaction with the QALY’s constrained and somewhat 
dominating scope [51, 52] and thus with the inability of the 
cost per QALY approach to suiciently capture the beneits 
valued by societies.
Several countries have already decided not to use a cost 
per QALY approach. It has been rejected in Germany [53] 
and Spain, and, despite increasing interest, remains largely 
unused in the United States [54]. In France, it is a minor 
component of HTA [55], and some Latin American coun-
tries have also shown reluctance to implement it [56]. These 
jurisdictions have opted largely for incorporating other 
aspects beyond clinical health in a deliberative approach, 
although the eiciency frontier and MCDA have both played 
an occasional role. While HTA in these healthcare systems 
functions, some will remain uncomfortable with such an 
approach, preferring to adjust the threshold. Indeed, relaxing 
the constraint on the threshold appears to be the direction of 
travel of even NICE in the UK [42]. An in-depth comparison 
of countries applying alternative approaches with respect to 
equity and eiciency, as well as transparency and legitimacy, 
should be high on the research agenda.
Although this tacks away from the foundation of maxi-
mizing aggregate health, it complicates providing an empir-
ical basis for decision making. By how much should the 
threshold be adjusted and for which other beneits? Who 
makes these modiications and on what basis? What are the 
implications for considering opportunity cost? Tacking away 
requires answers to these questions.
Fig. 2  Proposed relative value gradients according to quality-of-life 
improvement and initial severity (data taken from Nord [48])
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Regardless of the manner by which the cost per QALY 
approach is extended—qualitative deliberations, quantitative 
adjustments, or both—why stick with the QALY if maximiz-
ing aggregate health is not the sole aim? One reason is con-
venience. Many societies have invested considerable eforts 
in implementing it, and awareness of the concept has already 
extended somewhat beyond the specialized conines of HTA, 
and the introduction of completely new concepts will face 
substantial hurdles. Another justiication is that staying with 
the threshold provides a benchmark for moving towards 
other criteria for which explicit arguments have to be made. 
As with staying the course, a society that moves towards an 
extended QALY approach is still subject to its violations of 
the fundamental assumptions and the resulting uncertainties 
in determining a justiiable reimbursement price. If a single 
threshold is replaced with a sliding scale, the other criteria 
and justiications for supporting them have to be explicit.
Relying on an eiciency frontier is one way to move 
away from both the QALY and the single threshold. How-
ever, the eiciency frontier allows for ever-higher prices per 
unit of beneit as the absolute beneit grows (i.e. decreas-
ing eiciency), with no inherent guidance on the minimum 
eiciency required. The eiciency frontier approach also 
assumes that established expenditures relect societal pri-
orities, but there is no reason to believe this is reliably so in 
the absence of explicit valuations across therapeutic areas.
MCDA is another way to extend HTA beyond the single 
dimension of the QALY, but this method has not been devel-
oped for recurring decisions at a societal level. The score 
that results has no inherent meaning, although it can be used 
in an eiciency frontier as an integrated measure of beneit, 
thus removing one di culty with this frontier approach [57].
Separating the valuation of life-extension from quality-
of-life improvements avoids di cult-to-sustain assumptions 
involving a single integrating index, but requires the unten-
able assumption that there are no interactions between the 
domains. Moreover, establishing the anchor point is chal-
lenging, particularly if the domains are not independently 
evaluable. This also raises the question of whether a univer-
sal quality-of-life index applies in disparate illnesses. Can 
an index such as the EQ-5D [58] be leveraged in this regard 
[59]? However, there is nothing preventing extension of the 
method to other dimensions. By scaling the relative value of 
gains in disparate domains and anchoring these to speciic 
monetary amounts, the approach implies cross-domain rela-
tive values.
Establishing an acceptable price to pay for a given set of 
beneits is a problem that goes beyond the remit of the HTA 
into political and other spheres because, in the end, it has to 
do with how much of society’s resources are allocated to the 
healthcare budget and what priorities are set therein. Perhaps 
then, HTA should return to the foundation of opportunity 
cost, and, rather than appraise whether an intervention is 
‘worth it’, provide instead an estimate of what would have 
to be given up (with all its consequences) or how much addi-
tional funding would be needed if nothing is displaced. This 
would provide the trade-of consequences explicitly, without 
the need for a cost-efectiveness threshold or even a QALY. 
The decision-making body thus stands to be swayed less by 
a single threshold-driven decision rule and can accord due 
weight to all relevant inputs. This deliberative decision mak-
ing is arguably much more diicult, and, without explicit 
well-deined processes and decision rules, may be less trans-
parent and consistent.
7  Conclusion
Given the substantial implications of these decisions to 
patients, families and society in general, it behoves our ield 
to strive for an approach that addresses as fully as possible 
the healthcare system’s aims, is methodologically sound, 
and is feasible to implement within the available timelines 
and resource constraints. None of the alternatives examined 
yet achieve this.
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